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Criminal Liability of a Business Man for Conduct of His Employees
In Ex parte Marley1 a clerk in a butcher shop short-weighted a cus-
tomer in the sale of one veal steak and four or five lamb chops. The clerk
was fined $100, while his employer, who was absent at the time of sale
and who allegedly did not know of and had not authorized the transac-
tion, was sentenced to 90 days in jail.2 Discharging a writ of habeas
corpus, 3 the Supreme Court of California denied that the conviction was
a deprivation of due process 4 and held that the case fell within a recog-
nized class of police offenses for which no proof of intent or guilty
knowledge is required.
As a general rule, the principal is not criminally liable for the acts of
his servant or agent unless he authorizes or aids and abets the commission
of a crime. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to
criminal law.5
But the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, may define as
crimes certain acts irrespective of the defendant's personal participation
or of his guilty knowledge.6 Since about the middle of the nineteenth
century, legislatures and courts have recognized an ever increasing group
1 .... Cal. (2d) ..... 175 P. (2d) 842 (1946).
2 Cal. Business and Professions Code (Deering 1944) §12023: "Every person who
by himself or his employee or agent, or as the employee or agent of another, sells
any commodity, at, by, or according to gross weight or measure, or at, by, as of, or
according to any weight, measure or count which is greater than the true net weight
* . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Misdemeanors in California, except where otherwise provided by law, are punish-
able by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not
exceeding $500, or both. Cal. Penal Code (Deering 1941) §19.
3 On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the California Supreme Court within
its discretion may review the constitutionality and proper construction of criminal
statutes. Cal. Const. Art VI, § 4; Cal. Penal Code (Deering 1941) §1473, and
(Deering Supp. 1945) §1475.
4 Cal. Const. Art. 1, §13.
5 United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of So. Cal. 43 Fed. Supp. 966, (S. D.
Cal., 1942); People v. Green 22 Cal. App. 45, 133 Pac. 334 (1913); People v. Doble
203 Cal. 510, 265 Pac. 184 (1928) ; Commonwealth v. Stevens 155 Mass. 291, 29 N. E.
508 (1892) ; Lovelace v. State 191 Miss. 62, 2 So. (2d) 797 (1941); State v. Burns
215 Minn. 182, 9 N.W. (2d) 518 (1943).
6 "The prosecution to which (defendant) was subjected is based on a now
familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation.
Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger." (Italics supplied.) Frankfurter, J. in
United States v. Dotterweich 320 U. S. 277, 280 (1943).
But for offenses involving jail sentences would not the "clear and present danger"
test of the freedom of speech cases be preferable? Schenck v. Unitec States 249
U. S. 668 (1896); Bridges v. California 314 U. S. 252 (1941). Or is a jail sentence
a lesser 'deprivation of liberty than a denial of free speech?
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
of offensespunishable without regard to any mental element. It has been
said that the simultaneous but independent growth of "public welfare
offenses" in Great Britain and the United States represents the impact
on the law of the rapid technological and economic changes of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries and the consequent shift of emphasis from
the individual to the social welfare.7 Various statutes, enacted during
the past hundred years to protect the public from specific abuses, throw
upon the principal the risk of criminal liability arising from the mere
existence of an agency or employment relationship. 8 These statutes have
even been construed as denying to the defendant the defenses 6f ignor-
ance or mistake of either or both principal and agent.9 In holding the
principal accountable for the conduct of his agent, courts have expressly
recognized the need for regulation, the difficulty of enforcement if a
defendant were permitted to plead lack of intent, the danger that an
employer might shift responsibility to his employees, and the probability
that a principal could prevent most infractions by his agents.' 0
Criminal responsibility of the principal usually turns on the construe-
tion of the statute. Sometimes the legislature specifically provides that a
statute shall apply to the principal and that intent is not a necessary
7 See Sayer, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 55, for an analysis
of the history of these cases. The imposition of absqlutp criminal liability appears to
have originated in the public nuisance capes. Rex v. Medley 6 Car. & P. 290, 172
,Bg. Reprint 1246 (1834) (director of gas company convicted for contamination
of Thames River although ignorant of the offense); Regina v. Stephens L. R. 1 Q. B.
702 (1866) (aged owner of slate quarry convicted of nuisance because his men
permitted rubbish to fall into river; proceedings, although criminal in form, were
termed essentially civil in nature; hence, no 'nmns rea necessary.) See Commonwealth
v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R, Co. 202 Mass. 394, 395, 88 N. E. 764, 765 (1909)
(obstructing highway punishable by common law as well as by statute); State v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. 84 N. J. L. 550, 87 Atl. 86 (1913) (locomotives' emitting of
smokes and smells indictable as a public nuisance).
8 Carolene Products Co. v. United States 140 F. (2d) 61 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) (sale
of filled milk); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. District of Columbia 89 F. (2d)
502 (App. D. C., 1937) (short weight by unidentified employee); Ex parte Casper-
son 69 Cal. App. (2d) 441, 159 P. (2d) 96 (1945) (sale of inedible eggs by de-
fendant's partner); Meigs v. State 94 Fla. 809, 114 So. 448 (1927) (employees
packed for shipment fish under statutory length); Lunsford v. State 34 8. E.
(2d) 731 (Ga. App. 1945) (partner violated statute providing that no professional
bondsman after becoming surety on a criminal bond should thereafter receive any
sum in the case); New Orleans v. Vinci 153 La. 528, 96 So. 110 (1922) (having in
possession milk below standard); People v. Thompson & Potter 289 N. Y. 259, 45
N. E. (2d) 432 (1942) (having in possession for sale oysters not registered with
New York City Department of Health); State v. Weisberg 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N. E.
(2d) 870 (1943) (short weight); City of Spokane v. Patterson 46 Wash. 93, 89
Pac. 492 (1907) (blasting with dynamite in unsafe manner). Cf. Goldsmith, Jr.,
Grant Co. v. United States 254 U. S. 505 (1921) (auto owned by defendant on con-
ditional sale contract used by purchaser for transporting liquor; auto forfeited);
Feeley v. City of Melrose 205 Mass. 329, 91 N. E. 306 (1910) (plaintiffs denied
recovery for personal injuries received while unknowingly being driven in unregis-
tered auto).
9 Commonwealth v. Jackson 345 Pa. 456, 28 A. (2d) 894 (1942) (defendant's
dairymaid sold milk ten cents below minimum price).
10 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. District of Columbia 89 F. (2d) 502 (App.
D. C., 1937). The opinion set out without comment testimony of the manager of the
local chain store that the meat department was inventoriea every Saturday night
and that the manager was held accountable for every pound of meat. The implica-
tion would appear to be that employers who impose such pressure on their employees
will not be heard to complain if held accountable for the employees' misconduct.
But why not infer intent in such a situation?
1947]
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ingredient of the crime; but more often legislation is ambiguous." To
determine legislative intent the court must then look to the overall pur-
poses of the statute, its legislative history, and the seriousness of the
offense. 1 2 Some cases stress the distinction between acts malun in se and
those malum prohibitun13 and suggest that criminal intent and guilty
knowledge are still essential elements of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude.' 4 But although most cases involve minor offenses with small penal-
ties, the courts have sustained heavy sentences for serious misdemeanors
and even felonies where the defendant was not allowed to plead lack of
participation or guilty knowledge. 15
Judicial recognition of a doctrine of vicarious criminal liability may
be in part a result of a faulty classification of the cases and a failure to
analyse the different meanings of such words as "criminal intent" and
"guilty knowledge." The Massachusetts court, for example, has cited
cases sustaining convictions for adultery, where the defendant did not
know that his paramour was married, for the proposition that a principal
can be punished for the conduct of his employees. 16 Most courts have
failed to recognize a distinction between the question of whether a
defendant should be punished for his own acts, in the absence of a show-
ing of criminal intent, and whether he should be punished for another's
11 Commonwealth v. Sacks 214 Mass. 72, 100 N. E. 1019 (1913) involved a typical
statute which provided that "whoever, himself or by his agent" etc. is guilty.
Mass. Stat. (1907) c. 394 §1. Also see the California statute in Ex parte Marley
set out in note 2 supra. State v. Weisberg 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N. E. (2d) 870
(1943) is typical of a number of cases where principals have been convicted even
though the statute makes no reference to servants or agents. The absence of words
such as "knowingly" or "wilfully" is usually held to indicate the legislative intent
that proof of intent should not be required, and such statutes usually are construed
as making the principal accountable for the conduct of his agents. But of. State v.
Pinto 129 N. J. L. 255, 29 A. (2d) 180 (1942) which, reversed a conviction of a
principal because even though intent is not required "the unlawful act must be
brought h6me to the defendant."
12 See the dictum of Atkin, J. in Mousell Bros. Ltd. v. London & North-Western
Railway Co. 2 K. B. 836 (1917). Smith v. State 231 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270 (1931).
13 "Strictly malum prohibitum offenses created under the exercise of the police
power do not require intent and purpose on the part of the accused violator to
disregard them, unless the statute should so require." Duncan v. Commonwealth 289
Ky. 231, 158 S. W. (2d) 396 (1942). People v. Boxer 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 628 (1940).
But violations of the Anti-Narcotic Act were impliedly held to be nalum prohibitum
by Taft, C. J. in United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922). The distinction
between offenses malum in se and those malum prohibitun is generally discredited
and would seem to possess little validity.
14 This would appear to be the basis of the opinion in State v. Pansey 61 Nev.
330, 130 P. (2d) 264 (1942), holding that the legislature could not lawfully making
it a crime to receive or buy stolen goods without regard to guilty knowledge, crim-
inal intent, or criminal negligence.
15 State v. Lindberg 125 Wash. 51, 215 P. 41 (1923) (statute made it a felony
for a bank director to borrow from his own bank unless authorized by a special
resolution of the board of directors; defendant not permitted to prove that he did
not know that money loaned to him by an agent came from his own bank; indeter-
minate sentence of one to five years held not a deprivation of due process nor an
infliction of a cruel and unsual punishment). Cf. Commonwealth v. Mixer 207
Mass. 140, 93 N. E. 249 (1910) (driver for a common carrier convicted for trans-
porting liquor in violation of statute requiring seller or consignor to mark package
in designated manner; fact that employee could not reasonably know that the
package, a sugar barrel, contained liquor held immaterial since no intent was re-
quired by statute. See also United States v. Greenbaum 138 F. (2d) 437 (C.C.A.
3d, 1943,.
16 Commonwealth v. Sacks 215 Mass. 72, 100 N. E. 1019 (1913); Commonwealth
v. Mixer 207 Mass. 140, 93 N. E. 249 (1910).
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conduct. Some of the precedents for the imposition of criminal liability
on the principal involve fact situations where criminal intent and guilty
knowledge might well have been inferred and where, therefore, there was
no necessity for holding that these traditional requirements of criminal
law cofild be dispensed with.17
Although both state and federal courts have gone far to uphold the
discretion of the legislature in defining offenses and designating the
penalties, it would seem that the Constitution compels some limitation
to the imposition of criminal liability on the prii~cipal for the conduct
of his agent. In the two states in which the questiofi has arisen, statutes
abrogating the defense of insanity in criminal trials have been invali-
dated on the grounds that due process of law requires that a jury shall
be permitted to pass on the defendant's sanity as a substantive fact
going to his guilt or innocense. 18 One of the opinions distinguished the
statutory offense cases on the grounds that a principal is a "free moral
agent;" 19 but it might well be inquired to what extent he is free in the
selection and control of his employees. 20
Precedents in the related field of statutory presumptions would appear
to present a forceful constitutional argument. In creating presumptions
legislatures have been motivated by the same considerations of conven-
ience in enforcement which the courts stress so heavily in the statutory
offense cases. Yet the Supreme Court has not hestitated to invalidate
such presumptions as a denial of due process if they subjected the ac-
cused to "hardship or oppression. '21 A jurist might draw a nice dis-
17 Commonwealth v. Smith 166 Mass. 370, 44 N. E. 503 (1896) (defendant con-
victed for the statutory offense of being -present when gaming implements were
found); Commonwealth v. Kane 173 Mass. 477, 53 N. E. 919 (1899) (defendant
convicted of being found present at a place where implements for smoking opium
and preparations of opium were found).
18 Sinclair v. State 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg 69
Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). The opinions were based on the due process clauses
and other provisions of the state constitutions.
19 Rudkin, C. J. concurring in State v. Strasburg, 69 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
20 ",There is nothing an employer can do to protect himself, as the act of the
employee is one which depends entirely upon use of his own faculties and senses
and it is impossible for the employer to determine with any degree of accuracy
whether the faculties and senses of the employee are functioning properly and
accurately during all his working hours." Carter, J. dissenting in Ex parte Marley
175 P. (2d) 832, 836.
21 "... Within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted
from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in
substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the de-
fendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation,
or at least that upon a balance of convenience or of opportunities for knowledge
the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accusor without sub-
jecting the accused to hardship or oppression." Cardozo, J. in Morrison v. Califor-
nia, 291 U. S. 82, 88, 89 (1934) invalidating as a denial of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment a provision of the Alien Land Law, Cal. Stat. (1927),
880, c. 528 which placed the burden on defendant to prove that he was a citizen or
eligible to become a citizen of the United States.
Tot v. United States 319 U. S. 463 (1943) invalidated as a violation of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment a presumption created by the- Federal
Firearms Act 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938) 15 U. S. C. A. § 902 (f) (1939): "A
statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection be-
tween the fact prove'd and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one
from the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two." Roberts, J. 319 U. S. 463, 467. Accord: Bailey v. Alabama 219 U. S. 219
(1911); Manley v. Georgia 279 U. S. 1 (1929). See Bollenbach. v. United States
326 U. S. 607, 611 (1945).
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